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Paternity and Prolonged Pregnancy
Irwin N. Perr, M.D.*
T HE FOLLOWING ARTICLE recently appeared to the amusement
of a nationwide audience: I
Chicago (UPI)-A Superior Court Judge consulted a
book on medical curiosities yesterday and ruled that a child
can be born to a husband and wife 15 months after they
have separated.
Judge Harry G. Hershenson said a 15 month pregnancy
is possible-medically and legally.
He ordered Elmer Richter, 26, a gas station attendant,
to pay $15 a week support for a child born to his wife, Pa-
tricia, 15 months after they separated.
That's how long Richter claimed they were separated.
His wife said it was only seven months. She was granted a
divorce.
The time lag really didn't matter because Richter's at-
torney agreed with the judge that a baby can be born as
much as 20 months after conception.
The judge said a book entitled "Anomalies and Curiosi-
ties of Medicine," 2 tells of pregnancy periods lasting more
than 15 months.
"We acknowledge paternity because there is that possi-
bility," said Richter's attorney.
Not long ago, I heard from an acquaintance that a friend
whose husband had died fifteen months previously had had a
baby-this, the friend had explained to questioners, was due to
a process known as "delayed conception," obviously an innova-
tion brought forth by laymen to cover a multitude of sins.
Necessity was the mother of more than one thing in this instance.
The question of paternity and prolonged pregnancy is a sub-
ject not only of great professional interest to lawyers and phy-
sicians, but is one that all of us find sometimes intriguing,
sometimes humorous, and sometimes tragic.
* B.S., Franklin and Marshall College; M.D., Jefferson Medical College;
Diplomate in Psychiatry, American Board of Neurology and Psychiatry;
Clinical Director, Fairhill Psychiatric Hospital (formerly The Cleveland
Regional Treatment Center); Second year law student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
I Cleveland Press, Oct. 10, 1958.
2 Gould, G. M. and Pyle, W. L., Anomalies and Curiosities of Medicine.
Sydenham Publishers, New York (1937).
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Some Historical Notes
Before proceeding with the subject at hand, a few com-
ments are in order concerning the quoting of old books and in a
context alien to the subject matter. The book, Anomalies and
Curiosities of Medicine, is a gold-mine of odd pieces of informa-
tion; it is a compilation of reports dating back to antiquity. How-
ever, it does not fully evaluate or substantiate reports. As such,
it should have no standing in a law court. This book, published
in 1937, reports a case from a textbook 3 printed in 1864. Sur-
prisingly enough, the 1864 book was misquoted. Not so sur-
prisingly, the earlier volume was in turn quoting a book 4 written
in 1805. This author could not obtain a copy of the 1805 book,
so the chain of proof was interrupted. In any event, the utiliza-
tion of a medical book written in 1805 as a medicolegal au-
thority is, to say the least, a questionable practice.
This paper is limited to a pregnancy resulting in a viable
fetus. Retention of a dead fetus, either intrauterine or ex-
trauterine, does occur sometimes. When such a fetus calcifies (a
lithopedion), remnants of the fetus may remain indefinitely to be
found on death of the woman. Thus cases have been reported
of retained dead fetus of a duration as much as 28, 48, and even
60 years.
In discussing prolonged pregnancy, Anomalies and Curiosi-
ties of Medicine (mentioned above) illustrates the genesis of some
reports which become sanctified by the passage of time, thus:
The question of retardation of labor, like that of pre-
mature birth, is open to much discussion, and authorities
differ as to the limit of protraction with viability. Aulus
Gellius says that, after a long conversation with physicians
and wise men, the Emperor Adrian decided in a case before
him, that of a woman of chaste manners and irreproachable
character, the child born eleven months after her husband's
death was legitimate. Under the Roman law the Decemviri
established that a woman may bear a viable child at the
tenth month of pregnancy. Paulus Zacchias, physician to
Pope Innocent X, declared that birth may be retarded to the
tenth month, and sometimes to a longer period. A case was
decided in the Supreme Court of Friesland, a province in
the northern part of The Netherlands, October, 1634, in
which a child born three hundred and thirty-three days after
the death of (the) husband was pronounced legitimate. The
Parliament of Paris was gallant enough to come to the rescue
3 Hodge, H. L., Principles and Practice of Obstetrics, Philadelphia, 1864.
4 Dewees, W. P., Medical Miscellanies, Philadelphia, 1805.
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of a widow and save her reputation by declaring that a child
born after a fourteen month's gestation was legitimate.
Bartholinus speaks of an unmarried woman of Leipzig who
was delivered after a pregnancy of sixteen months. The civil
code of France provides that three hundred days shall con-
stitute the longest period of legitimacy of an infant; the
Scottish law, three hundred days; and the Prussian law, three
hundred and one days.
Gould and Pyle5 report an "incredible" case of three years'
gestation from the Histoire de l'Academie des Sciences. Another
reference6 from the seventeenth century quotes an earlier author
who related a twenty-three month pregnancy. "Aventium (re-
ported) one after two years; and Mercurialis, a birth after a four
years' gestation which is, of course, beyond belief." Thormeau
(Tours, 1580) and Santorine (Venice, 1721) report twenty-three
month pregnancies. As time went along, reports became less
fantastic. Thus in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, re-
ports of five 12 month, one 14 month, one 19 month preg-
nancies are reported, and the nineteenth century could report
only rather undramatic pregnancies of 308, 319, 332 and 336 days
with only one of 420 days to provide much comment. This sad
state of affairs is indicated by reports in days rather than in the
months and years of the earlier, more dramatic eras.
Other reports in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
mention pregnancies of 11 (four), 12 (three), 13 (one), 15 (two),
17 (one), and 18 (one) months. Many of these were retained
dead fetuses.
For practical purposes, this material is only of historical in-
terest. Certainly, in view of the millions of births since the turn
of the century, more current scientific appraisals can be obtained.
The Attitude of Law Towards Prolonged Pregnancy
Gestation or pregnancy is the period from conception to
birth. Since the moment of conception is difficult to measure,
various standards are used-which will be discussed under the
section dealing with medical comments. Because of the short
fertility span of human spermatoza, conception takes place with-
in a day of coitus.
5 Gould, G. M. and Pyle, W. L., op. cit. supra, n. 2.
6 Jonston, J., Thaumatographia naturalis, 1665.
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Gestation, in the courts, has been described in various man-
ners. In Dazey v. Dazey 7 the court states,
The word "gestation" is defined by the dictionary as
being the period of time in which a woman carries a fetus in
her womb, from conception to birth. But as used in all medi-
cal authorities, this phrase does not mean the actual num-
ber of days from conception to birth. One cannot take the
date of birth as a starting point and count backwards so
many days and say that a child was conceived on any par-
ticular date and even within limitations of as much as sixty
days. The average period of "gestation" which the medical
term connotes is from 270 to 290 days from the last menstrual
period of the mother. As a medico-legal term, this phrase
does not mean now, nor has it ever meant that "length of
gestation" is from the date of conception to the date of birth
of a child. The actual duration of pregnancy is not yet known,
but ordinarily 280 days, or 10 lunar months, elapse between
the commencement of the last menstrual flow and the onset
of labor, though a considerable number of children are born
shortly before or after the expiration of that period.
As the problem faces the law courts, the key point is the pos-
sibility of a pregnancy of a duration from a specific last date
available for intercourse of the parties.
Entering into this consideration is the attitude of the law
towards paternity. One of the strongest presumptions in law is
that a child born in wedlock is legitimate. It is the policy of the
law to favor the legitimacy of children and to declare them legiti-
mate if it may fairly be done. This rule is so well entrenched that
it has been enunciated in a vast number of cases. The cases be-
low8 are a sampling of post-war cases (since 1946). Ohio follows
7 Dazey v. Dazey, 50 Cal. App. 2nd 15, 122 P. 2d 308 (1942).
"The most reliable datum from which to estimate the beginning is the
date of fruitful coition, and, reckoning from this day, pregnancy has
been found to vary from 220 to 330 days, the average being 270 days.
From time immemorial women have reckoned 280 days, 10 lunar months,
or 9 calendar months, from the first day of the last period as the length
of normal gestation, and for practical purposes, this may be accepted
because in the majority of cases it holds true, but one must remember
and admit the exceptions. No doubt some children require a longer
time in the uterus for full development than others. Some seeds in
favorable soil grow faster than others. The writer has delivered chil-
dren that were carried eight months that were as matured as full-term
infants, and also in one case, he delivered a child weighing 3 pounds
which was fully three weeks over term."
8 Presumption of legitimacy-Ray v. Social Sec. Bd., 73 F. Supp. 58 (D. C.,
S. D. Ala., 1947); Block v. Ewing, 105 F. Supp. 25, (D. C. S. D., Calif., Cen-
tral Div., 1952); Darrell v. U. S., 82 F. Supp. 18 (D. C. E. D. Mo., 1949);
Faggard v. Filipowich, 248 Ala. 182, 27 So. 2d 10 (1946); Taylor v. Taylor,
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from preceding page)
249 Ala. 419, 31 So. 2d 579 (1947); Butler v. Butler, 254 Ala. 375, 48 So. 2d
318, (1950); Jackson v. Jackson, 259 Ala. 267, 66 So. 2d 745 (1953); Balance
v. Balance, 261 Ala. 97, 72 So. 2d 851 (1954); Carnegie v. Carnegie, 261 Ala.
146, 73 So. 2d 556 (1954); Arthur v. Arthur, 262 Ala. 126, 77 So. 2d 477
(1955); Morrison v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 100 (1947); West v.
King, 222 Ark. 809, 262 S. W. 2d 897 (1953); Serway v. Galentine, 75 Cal.
App. 2d 86, 170 P. 2d 32 (1946); People v. Kelly, 77 Cal. App. 2d 23, 174 P.
2d 342 (1946); Murr v. Murr, 87 Cal. App. 2d 511, 197 P. 2d 369 (1948);
People v. Hamilton, 88 Cal. App. 2d 398, 198 P. 2d 907 (1948); Cinders v.
Lewis, 93 Cal. App. 2d 90, 208 P. 2d 687 (1949); Williams v. Moon, 98 Cal.
App. 2d 214, 219 P. 2d 902 (1950); Hill v. Johnson, 102 Cal. App. 2d 94, 226
P. 2d 655 (1951); In Re Marshall's Estate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 747, 262 P. 2d 42
(1953); Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A. 2d 115 (D. C., 1951); In re Ruff's
Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 32 So. 2d 840 (1947); Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56
S. E. 2d 171 (1949); Stephens v. State, 80 Ga. App. 823, 57 S. E. 2d 493 (1950);
Thomey v. Thomey, 67 Idaho 393, 181 P. 2d 777 (1947); Lewis v. Lo Chirco,
350 Ill. App. 394, 112 N. E. 2d 917 (1953); Crawford v. Beatrice, 122 Ind. App.
98, 102 N. E. 2d 915 (1952); Williams v. Williams, 311 Ky. 45, 223 S. W. 2d 360
(1949); Shepherd v. Shepherd, 314 Ky. 575, 236 S. W. 2d 477 (1951); Ousley
v. Ousley, - Ky. -, 261 S. W. 2d 817 (1953); Little v. Little, - Ky. -, 275 S. W.
2d 588 (1955); Succession of Gains, 227 La. 318, 79 So. 2d 322 (1955); Mona-
han v. Monahan, 142 Me. 72, 46 A. 2d 706 (1946); Dayhoff v. State, 206 Md. 25,
109 A. 2d 760 (1954); State v. E. A. H., 246 Minn. 299, 75 N. W. 2d 195 (1956);
Boone v. State, 211 Miss. 318, 51 So. 2d 473 (1951); Bernheimer v. First Natl.
Bank of Kansas City, 359 Mo. 1119, 225 S. W. 2d 745 (1949); In re Oakley's
Estate, 149 Neb. 556, 31 N. E. 2d 557 (1948); Hudson v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210,
36 N. W. 2d 851 (1949); Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 217 P. 2d 355
(1950); In re Rogers' Estates, 30 N. J. Super. 479, 105 A. 2d 28 (1954);
In re Thompson's Estate, 271 App. Div. 570, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 374 (1946);
Lane v. Eno, 277 App. Div. 324, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 789 (1950); People ex rel.
Schacter v. Schwartz, 279 App. Div. 896, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 70 (1952); Thomp-
son v. Nichols, 286 App. Div. 810, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 590 (1955); Lockwood v.
Lockwood, - Misc. -, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (1946); Altomare v. Altomare, -
Misc. -, 63 N. Y. S. 2d 71 (1946); Kingsbury v. Kingsbury, - Misc. -, 75
N. Y. S. 2d 699 (1947); Berntsen v. Berntsen, - Misc. -, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 855
(1949); P. V. Department of Health, 200 Misc. 1090, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 586
(1951); C. V. C., 200 Misc. 631, 109 N. Y. S. 2d 276 (1951); People ex rel.
Louvar v. Convent of Sisters of Mercy in Brooklyn, - Misc. -, 109 N. Y. S.
2d 846 (1951); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 208 Misc. 633, 143 N. Y. S. 2d
221 (1955); In re Olson's Estate, - Misc. -, 73 N. Y. S. 2d 876 (1947); In re
Adoption of Anonymous Minor Child, 192 Misc. 359, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 121
(1948); In re Niles' Will, - Misc. -, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1950); In re Opper-
man's Estate, - Misc. -, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 503 (1952); In re Bilotta's Estate, -
Misc. -, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 331 (1951), affirmed 281 A. D. 887, 120 N. Y. S. 2d
248 (1953); People on Complaint of Fischer v. Jones, - Misc. -, 101 N. Y. S.
2d 317 (1950); People on Complaint of E. V. P., 201 Misc. 820, 105 N. Y. S.
2d 521 (1951); People v. Towns, 201 Misc. 322, 115 N. Y. S. 2d 39 (1951);
Saratoga Co. Com'r v. V. A. B., 205 Misc. 1004, 131 N. Y. S. 2d 634 (1954);
Bygland v. Gouse, - Misc. -, 134 N. Y. S. 2d 328 (1954); affirmed 285 A. D.
1069, 141 N. Y. S. 2d 503 (1955); Mills v. Mills, 186 Misc. 855, 62 N. Y. S. 2d
344 (1946); Saks v. Saks, 189 Misc. 667, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 797 (1947); Dunbar v.
Dunbar, 191 Misc. 236, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 586 (1948); Gilpin v. Gilpin, 197 Misc.
319, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 706 (1950); Houston v. Houston, 199 Misc. 469, 99 N. Y. S.
2d 199 (1950); Panza v. Panza, - Misc. -, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 262 (1952); Law-
rence v. Lawrence, - Misc. -, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 529 (1954); Plato v. Plato, 206
Misc. 497, 132 N. Y. S. 2d 829 (1954); State v. Bowan, 230 N. C. 203, 52 S. E.
2d 345 (1949); Storm v. Storm, - North Dakota -, 75 N. W. 2d 750 (1956);
Winget v. Winget, 202 Okla. 298, 213 P. 2d 288 (1949); In re McKee's Estate,
378 Pa. 607, 108 A. 2d 214 (1954); In re Thorn's Estate, 353 Pa. 603, 46 A.
(Continued on next page)
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this general principle.9 The law will even, at times, go so far as to
presume a former marriage to make a child legitimate and not
a bastard.10 Thus, the law will attempt to declare children legiti-
mate unless there is gross unfairness."
Nonetheless, the presumption of legitimacy may be over-
come, with numerous cases affirming this principle. 12 Clear and
(Continued from preceding page)
2d 258 (1946); Peoples Nat. Bank of Greenville v. Manos Bros., Inc., 226 So.
C. 257, 84 S. E. 2d 857 (1954); Carnes v. Kay, - Tex. Civil Appeals, Amaril-
lo -, 210 S. W. 2d 882 (1948); Byrd v. Travelers Ins. Co., - Tex. Civil Appeals,
San Antonio -, 275 S. W. 2d 861 (1955); Carfa v. Albright, 39 W. 2d 697, 237
P. 2d, 795 (1951); State ex rel. Lipscomb v. Joplin, 131 W. Va. 302, 47 S. E.
2d 221 (1948); In re Aronson, 263 Wisc. 604, 58 N. W. 2d 553 (1953).
9 Powell v. State, 84 0. S. 165, 95 N. E. 660 (1911); State ex rel. Walker v.
Clark, 144 0. S. 305, 58 N. E. 2d 773 (1944); State ex rel. Hoerres v. Wilkoff,
157 0. S. 286, 105 N. E. 2d 39 (1952); Snyder v. McClelland, 83 0. App. 377,
81 N. E. 2d 383 (1948); Lynn v. State, 47 0. App. 158, 191 N. E. 100 (1934);
Harris v. Seabury, 30 0. App. 42, 164 N. E. 121 (1928); Dirion v. Brewer, 20
0. App. 298, 151 N. E. 818 (1925); Waggoner v. State, 3 Ohio L. A. 181,(1925); Sieg v. State, 1 Ohio L. A. 814, .....-, (1923); La Roche v. La Roche,
10 Ohio App. 242 - - , (1917); Johnson v. Dudley, 4 Ohio Dec. 243, 3
0. N. P. 196 (1896).
10 Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S. E. 2d 171 (1949).
11 Stevenson v. Washington's Adm'r, 231 Ky. 233, 21 S. W. 2d 274 (1929);
Tinsley v. Tinsley, 193 Ky. 324, 235 S. W. 730 (1921); Stein v. Stein, 32 Ky.
L. R. 664, 106 S. W. 860 (1908); In re Stanton, - Misc. -, 123 N. Y. S. 458(1910); Dirion v. Brewer, 20 Ohio App. 298, 151 N. E. 818 (1925); Common-
wealth v. Moska, 107 Pa. Super. 72, 162 A. 343 (1932).
12 Block v. Ewing, 105 F. Supp. 25 (D. C., S. D. Calif. Central Div., 1952);
Butler v. Butler, 254 Ala. 375, 48 So. 2d 318 (1950); Jackson v. Jackson, 259
Ala. 267, 66 So. 2d 745 (1953); Carnegie v. Carnegie, 261 Ala. 146, 73 So. 2d
556 (1954); Arthur v. Arthur, 262 Ala. 126, 77 So. 2d 477 (1955); Morrison
v. Nicks, 211 Ark. 261, 200 S. W. 2d 100 (1947); West v. King, 222 Ark. 809, 262
S. W. 2d 897 (1953); Serway v. Galentine, 75 Cal. App. 2d 86, 170 P. 32(1946); Murr v. Murr, 87 Cal. App. 2d 511, 197 P. 2d 369 (1948); People v.
Hamilton, 88 Cal. App. 2d 398, 198 P. 2d 907 (1948); Cinders v. Lewis, 93
Cal. App. 2d 90, 208 P. 2d 687 (1949); McGillis v. Hofeditz, 101 Cal. App.
2d 760, 226 P. 2d 372 (1951); Hughes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P.
2d 172 (1954); In re Young's Estate, 132 Cal. App. 2d 25, 281 P. 2d 368 (1955);
Peters v. District of Columbia, - D. C. -, 84 A. 2d 115 (1951); Jones v. State,
88 Ga. App. 790, 78 S. E. 2d 88 (1953); Pilgram v. Pilgram, 118 Ind. App. 6,
75 N. E. 2d 159 (1947); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind. App. 232, 85 N. E. 2d 270
(1949); Gross v. Gross, - Ky. -, 260 S. W. 2d 655 (1953); Little v. Little, - Ky.
-, 275 S. W. 2d 588 (1955); Clark v. State, 208 Md. 316, 118 A. 2d 366 (1955);
Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S. W. 2d 89 (1947); Hudson
v. Hudson, 151 Neb. 210, 36 N. W. 2d 851 (1949); State by Doloff v. Sargent,
100 N. H. 29, 118 A. 2d 596 (1955); Groulx v. Groulx, 98 N. H. 481, 103 A. 2d
188 (1954); Cortese v. Cortese, 10 N. J. Super. 152, 76 A. 2d 717 (1950); In
re Pinder's Estate, 271 App. Div. 302, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 274 (1946); People on
Complaint of Vasek v. Guley, 281 App. Div. 927, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 825 (1953);
Benti v. Benti, - Misc. -, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 239 (1946); Urguhart v. Urguhart,
196 Misc. 664, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 484 (1949); Cairgle v. American Radiator and
Standard Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A. 2d 439 (1951); Com. v. McMillen, 178 Pa.
Super. 581, 115 A. 2d 816 (1955); Com. v. Oldham, 178 Pa. Super. 354, 115 A.
2d 895 (1955); Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc., 220 S. C. 447, 68 S. E.
2d 440 (1951).
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convincing proof is necessary to establish illegitimacy. 13 The
presumption of legitimacy can be removed by evidence that the
husband was entirely absent, at the period during which the child
must, in the course of nature, have been begotten; or only pres-
ent under such circumstances as afford clear and satisfactory
proof that there was no sexual intercourse. 14 In addition to im-
potency or absence of the husband, where sterility is capable of
definite determination, a conclusive presumption of legitimacy
arising from the marital relationship is not properly applicable.15
Conclusive proof that the husband had no powers of procreation,
or that circumstances were such as to render it impossible that
he could be the father, is necessary to bastardize a child born in
lawful wedlock. 16
The presumption that a child conceived during the existence
of a lawful marital relation is legitimate may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence that there was no sexual connec-
tion between the husband and the wife during the time in which
the child must have been conceived. 17 Thus, in an Ohio case,""
where a plaintiff in a bastardy proceeding had been divorced only
six months before a child was born to her, testimony as to the
impossibility of intercourse between the plaintiff and her former
husband within the period of possible conception was admissible.
Where inaccessibility is clearly inferable, the presumption of
parenthood is overcome. 19 Nonetheless, the courts will strain the
laws of nature or the indicia of the evidence presented in order
to maintain legitimacy.20
13 Schlenker v. Ferdon, 21 Ohio App. 222, 153 N. E. 113 (1926).
14 Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, 50 Eng. Rep. 457 (1846).
15 Hughes v. Hughes, 125 Cal. App. 2d 781, 271 P. 2d 172 (1954).
16 Powell v. State, 84 Ohio S. 165, 95 N. E. 660 (1911).
17 State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 144 0. S. 305, 58 N. E. 2d 773 (1944); Mc-
Ghee v. McGhee, 45 Ohio L. A. 465, 64 N. E. 2d 254 (1945).
is Yerian v. Brinker, 33 Ohio L. A. 591, 35 N. E. 2d 878 (1941).
19 In re Veselich, 22 Ohio App. 528, 154 N. E. 55 (1926).
20 People v. Hamilton, 88 Cal. App. 2d 398, 198 P. 2d 907 (1948)-Where the
laws of nature make it possible that the husband is the father of the wife's
child, the presumption of legitimacy is conclusive, but where the laws of
nature do not, only a disputable presumption applies, and evidence by prop-
er parties is admissible.
Williams v. Moon, 98 Cal. App. 2d 214, 219 P. 2d 902 (1950)-Where
the husband had access to his wife during the crucial period although the
parties were separated, a child born less than six months after the inter-
locutory divorce decree was entered for the wife, must be conclusively
presumed to be legitimate, notwithstanding that the wife during the
crucial period had intercourse with a third person.
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Even proof of a wife's adultery while cohabiting with her
husband cannot overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the
offspring.2 1, 22
The burden of proof is on the one alleging illegitimacy of the
child.23
It is readily apparent that the question of length of pregnancy
can enter into the legal determination of many cases. This comes
up often in paternity proceedings, disposition of estates and wills,
divorce, separation, adultery proceedings, and even in rape
cases.24 During the war, with its numerous separations, births at
variable periods following such separation initiated much litiga-
tion. The same holds true where children are born after divorce,
separation, or death of the husband, or after supposed sterility on
the part of the husband or illness rendering the husband im-
potent. Yet in all these cases, the question is determined by a
judicial decision on the duration of pregnancy.
Legal Opinions on the Normal Length of Gestation
In Dazey v. Dazey,25 the court measured the period of gesta-
tion from the beginning of the last menstrual period. This is used
as a reference for lawyers as it is included as authority in Words
and Phrases20 in which it is also stated that the "period of gesta-
tion" may be safely stated as a general proposition at from 252
to 285 days. Allowing the greatest latitude of inquiry, I think it
should be confined to a period of time between the lowest period
21 Monahan v. Monahan, 142 Me. 72, 46 A. 2d 706 (1946); Sayles v. Sayles,
323 Mass. 66, 80 N. E. 2d 21 (1948); In re Adoption of Anonymous Minor
Child, 192 Misc. 359, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 121 (1948); In re Miller, - Misc. -, 114
N. Y. S. 2d 304 (1952); Cairgle v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary
Corp., 366 Pa. 249, 77 A. 2d 439 (1951); Barr's Next of Kin v. Cherokee, Inc.,
220 S. C. 447, 68 S. E. 2d 440 (1951).
22 Boughner v. State, 6 Ohio L. A. 597, ------------ (1928)-Evidence
that from 279 to 281 days elapsed between the date that the husband
occupied the home with his wife and the date of birth, raised a con-
clusive presumption of legitimacy which could not be overcome by other
testimony regarding absence of intercourse on the part of the husband or
adulterous relations by the wife with other men.
23 Schlenker v. Ferdon, 21 Ohio App. 222, 153 N. E. 113 (1926).
24 State v. John Imperiale, 14 Misc. 2d 887, 180 N. Y. S. 2d 814 (1957)-
Here one element of defense was that the birth took place 282 days after
the last intercourse and that a limit should be placed at 280 days. The court
said that the 280 day rule is not a hard and fast one and there may be a
reasonable variation, such as a few days, of the normal period of gestation
without the necessity of invoking expert medical testimony.
25 Dazey v. Dazey, supra, n. 7.
26 32 Words and Phases 87.
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of time above stated and that of 300 days before the birth of the
child.27
Some courts have taken judicial notice of supposed norms
while others refuse to do so. For instance, one court 28 will say
"A court may take judicial notice that the period of human gesta-
tion is about 280 days or 9 calendar months"; a second49 will say,
"Courts judicially notice the ordinary period of gestation; but
such period is subject to many exceptions, and neither the mean
nor the extremes of such period is so commonly and precisely
known as to permit judicial notice"; while a third"0 states, "the
Court of Appeals would take judicial notice of what medical
science has determined to be the normal periods of gestation and
will consult medical books for that purpose." Often courts will
state that the normal period of human gestation is 280 days, but
that that period is subject to some variations.8 1 Another court 32
states bluntly that the minimum period of gestation is 240, the
average 273, and the maximum 300 days.
While many European nations set limits on the alleged length
of pregnancy by statute, English and American courts utilize all
possible information in making pertinent decisions instead of being
bound by an arbitrary number. Thus, considering length of time
alone, opinions vary widely. An example of a case involving the
importance of time illustrates this well.
In Goss v. Forman,33 a child was born on January 3, 1885. It
appeared that the mother had left her husband's house on April
4, 1884, and never saw him again, he dying on June 3, 1884. The
mother testified that she had sexual intercourse with her husband
on April 3, 1884. The husband was afflicted with Bright's disease
and dropsy from November, 1883, until his death. His attendant
27 Souchek v. Karr, 78 Neb. 488, 111 N. W. 150 (1907), quoting and adopting
definition in Masters v. Marah, 19 Neb. 458, 27 N. W. 438 (1886).
28 Fuller v. U. S., 65 A. 2d 589 (Mun. App., D. C., 1949).
29 Spears v. Veasley, 239 Ia. 1185, 34 N. W. 2d 185 (1948), also Bell v. Bell,
240 Ia. 934, 38 N. W. 2d 658 (1949).
Harward v. Harward, 173 Md. 339, 196 A. 318 (1938)-Neither the mean
or extremes of the period of gestation in a woman is so commonly known
that the courts may take judicial notice of them for the purpose of supply-
ing a basis for a decree which will determine the status or rights of parties
to a marriage or the issue thereof.
30 Steed v. State, 80 Ga. App. 360, 56 S. E. 2d 171 (1949).
31 Silke v. Silke, 325 Mass. 487, 91 N. E. 2d 200 (1950); Boudinier v. Bou-
dinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S. W. 2d 89 (1947); In re Niles' Will, - Misc. -,
99 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (1950); Bowers v. Bailey, 273 Ia. 295, 21 N. W. 2d 773
(1946).
32 People v. Case, 171 Mich. 282, 137 N. W. 55 (1912).
33 Goss v. Forman, 89 Ky. 318, 12 S. W. 387, 8 L. R. A. 102 (1889).
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physician testified that he could not have had sexual intercourse
after January, 1884, owing to his swollen condition. His physician
visited him on March 31 and April 8, 1884 and frequently before
and after, and found him growing worse constantly. The nurse
who was with him night and day testified that his swelling did
not abate between March 31st and April 8th, and that he did not
have sexual intercourse with his wife on April 3rd, nor at any
other time for several months before. The wife had had sexual
intercourse with another man on April 4, 1884 and several times
thereafter. Held, that the child was illegitimate.
Some Courts have used a limit of ten calendar months-
variously, after alleged intercourse, after dissolution of the mar-
riage, or after death of the husband.34
Cases will be presented where pregnancies of specific lengths
were upheld as compatible with a presumption of legitimacy.
Terminology varies but often the court states that an alleged
pregnancy of so many days did not overcome the presumption of
legitimacy.
Thus courts have allowed alleged pregnancies of 313 days
after conception, 35 301 days, 36 299 days,37 313 days,38 321 days39
320 days,40 324 days, 41 and 336 days.42
On the other hand, courts have ruled adversely in considera-
tion of the following alleged lengths of pregnancy-one year,43
34 In re Walker's Estate, 176 Cal. 402, 168 P. 689 (1917); State v. Coliton,
13 N. D. 582, 17 N. W. 2d 546 (1945); Erickson v. Schmill, 62 Neb. 368, 87
N. W. 166 (1901).
35 State v. Banik, 21 N. D. 417, 131 N. W. 262 (1911).
36 Franks v. State, 26 Ala. App. 430, 161 So. 549 (1935)-In a bastardy
prosecution, limiting the inquiry as to intercourse of prosecutrix with other
men within two hundred and eighty days before the birth of the child was
held erroneous, since the child could have been conceived within three
hundred and one days preceding birth.
Also Foster v. Cook, 3 Brown's Rep. Edin. 347, 29 English Rep. 575
(1791).
37 Luscombe v. Pettyjohn, Exeter Summer Assizes (1840).
38 Commonwealth v. Hoover, 3 Clark (Penna.) 514, 6 Pa. Law J. 195 (1846).
39 Taylor v. Taylor, 15 Tenn. App. 563 (1932).
40 State v. Van Patten, 236 Wisc. 186, 294 N. W. 560 (1940).
41 Ousley v. Ousley, - Ky. -, 261 S. W. 2d 817 (1953).
42 Pierson v. Pierson, 124 Wash. 319, 214 P. 159 (1923)-The fact that 336
days elapsed between the time when the husband and wife ceased to co-
habit and the time of birth did not conclusively show illegitimacy.
43 Bowen v. Parsons, 73 W. Va. 791, 90 S. E. 336 (1916)-No recovery can be
had in a bastardy proceeding by a married woman in absence of proof that
she had lived separately from her husband for one year or more, had not
cohabited with him within that time, and was delivered of a child after the
expiration of such period and while separation continued.
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322 days, 44 more than 10 months,45 321 days, 46 320 days,47 316
days,48 310 days, 49 307 days, 50 305 days,5' and 304 days. 2
A New York court accepted as legitimate a pregnancy of
355 days, 3 while the Preston-Jones peerage case in England was
one where the husband sued for divorce on the grounds of
adultery, the date of last coitus necessitating a pregnancy of 360
days if legitimacy were to be upheld. After the Divorce Com-
missioner dismissed the husband's case, he went through two
rehearings before finally being granted a divorce.
53a
Thus considerable contrast is found as to time allowed for
duration of pregnancy in contrast to the definitiveness found in
Europe, such as the 300 days allowed in Scotland, France, Switzer-
land, and Italy. American flexibility allows for the evaluation of
other evidence-which is most important in making a decision-
for instance, the fact of known adultery would be an important
consideration. The number of pregnancies lasting 300 days from
conception (not from the last menstrual period) is assuredly less
than one per cent. If there were no coitus by the husband with-
in 300 days and there was definite evidence of adulterous rela-
44 Duck v. The State ex rel. Dill, 17 Ind. 210 (1861).
45 Dean v. State, 29 Ind. 483 (1868)-Evidence that the husband was absent
from his wife (in the army) from January, 1864, until June 1865, and that
the child was born in November, 1865, is sufficient to establish its illegiti-
macy.
46 In re Aronson et al., Finley et al. v. Nelton, 263 Wisc. 604, 58 N. W. 2d
553 (1953).
47 Gillis v. State, 206 Wisc. 150, 238 N. W. 804 (1931).
48 Boudinier v. Boudinier, 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S. W. 2d 89 (1947)--So
greatly extended a period of gestation as one of 316 days claimed by the
wife in a divorce action wherein the husband charged adultery was not
of such common knowledge as to warrant judicial notice.
49 Commonwealth v. Watts, 179 Pa. Super. 398, 116 A. 2d 844 (1955).
50 Commonwealth v. Cicerchia, 177 Pa. Super. 170, 110 A. 2d 776 (1955)-
In a bastardy case, wherein the prosecutrix was a married woman, the
commonwealth's proof that the husband had had no access to the prosecu-
trix for 307 days prior to the birth of the child was sufficient to sustain the
burden of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy, even though so pro-
tracted a pregnancy was a possibility.
51 Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N. E. 2d 482 (1937).
52 In re McNamara's Estate, 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A. L. R. 313 (1919)-
Evidence that a child was born 304 days after its mother left her husband
to cohabit with another, together with evidence of other facts, was sufficient
to overcome the prima facie presumption regarding legitimacy of children
born during wedlock, and sustain a finding of illegitimacy.
53 Lockwood v. Lockwood, - Misc. -, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (1946).
5 3a Preston-Jones v. Preston-Jones, 65 T. L. R. 620, 47 L. G. R. 696, 93 S. J.
497 (1949). Mews' Annual Digest of English Case Law, Col. 106.
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tions, then the mathematical presumption would be at least 100
to 1 in favor of illegitimacy.
Medical Aspects of Prolonged Pregnancy
Not counting the innumerable births of the past, births since
the turn of the century number in the billions. The United
States alone has over 4 million births a year, the world 80 mil-
lion. In a country like ours, with fairly adequate medical re-
cording, we have had about a hundred million births since 1930.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that pregnancy is a subject
about which medical science should have vast accumulations of
information. Medical knowledge has been scanned for the pur-
pose of this paper, but it should be commented that the infor-
mation here does not represent a complete review of the subject.
It is presented rather as an overall picture of the subject.
Pregnancy occurs when the spermatozoon unites with the
ovum-within 24 to 48 hours following intercourse. Within
several days, the ovum becomes embedded in the wall of the
uterus, where it remains for the duration of the pregnancy.
The average woman menstruates every 28 to 30 days, though
there is considerable variation. She usually ovulates about 14
days prior to the following menstrual period-so that if a woman
has periods at 35 day intervals, she will ovulate nearer the 21st
day following the preceding period. The converse would hold
true in those who have 21 day periods. With those who are
irregular, no general statement can be made.
Beck 54 states,
Although ovulation unquestionably takes place about
fourteen days before the end of the menstrual cycle, the
exact date of its occurrence is not known. The beginning
of pregnancy, accordingly, cannot be estimated from the
rather indefinite time that the egg leaves the ovary. Like-
wise the date of fruitful coitus usually is unknown and
therefore cannot be used in estimating the time of fertiliza-
tion, and since we have no means of knowing when this
event occurs, the exact length of pregnancy cannot be de-
termined.
He reports variations in pregnancy from 230 to 329 days
from the beginning of the last period. The approximate length
54 Beck, A. C., Obstetrical Practice. The Williams and Wilkins Co., Balti-
more, 1951 (5th Ed.).
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of gestation would be 14 days less than this number. Kerr"5
agrees: "When we consider the conception-delivery interval
.... we have as yet no means of knowing the exact date of
fertilization of the ovum." Nonetheless, as will be shown, it is
possible to determine this often within a day or two of the exact
date.
For practical purposes, most obstetricians use the date of
the last period in calculating an expected date of delivery. The
most common formula is the Naegele rule, which computes such
a date by subtracting three months from twelve, and adding
seven days. Thus, if the last normal period began on January
10, the expected date would be October 17 (or to use numbers,
if the last period were 6/15, the expected date would be 3/22).
This rule is very helpful as a guide, but there may be wide
variations (see Table 1). Thus, using this rule, less than 1%
TABLE 1
(after Eastman)
Deviation from Calculated Date of Confinement. According to
Naegele's Rule, of 4,656 Births of Mature Infants.
DEVIATION EARLY DELIVERY ON LATE
IN DAYS DELIVERY CALCULATED DATE DELIVERY
0 189 4.1%
1-5 860 18.5% 773 16.6%
6-10 610 13.1 570 12.2
11-20 733 15.7 459 9.9
21-30 211 4.5 134 2.9
31 and over 75 1.6 42 0.9
The menstrual cycles of the mothers were 28± or - 5 days.
The infants were at least 47 cm. in length and 2,600 gm. in weight.
(Buerger and Korompai. 56)
go beyond 300 days from the last menstrual period or about 286
days from conception. In Strand's study,57 2.7% exceeded 301
55 Kerr, J. M. M., Obstetrics and Gynecology. The Williams and Wilkins Co.,
Baltimore, 1946 (4th Ed.).
56 Buerger, K. and Korompai, I., Die Bewertung der Berichnung des Geb-
urtstermines nach Naegele auf grund unsurer heutigen Kenntnisse, 63
Zentralbl. f. Gynak. 1290 (1939).
57 Strand, A., Prolonged Pregnancy, 35 Acta Obst. Gynec. Scand. 76 (1956).
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days using the Naegele rule (in 10,151 deliveries). Burkons5 s
found that in 2,600 cases, 159 or 6.1 per cent exceeded 295 days
from the last normal menstrual period. Nesbitt,59, 60 reports that
utilizing the above rule, 25 per cent exceed 41 weeks; 10-12%,
42 weeks; and 3-4%, 43 weeks or more. Of 7,415 births, 812 or
11% lasted more than 294 days (or about 280 days from concep-
tion)-this number dropped to 7.3 per cent when all pregnancies
over 20 weeks were included. It has been found that when inter-
vals between periods are longer than the usual, the pregnancy
lasts a few days longer and vice versa.6 1 Higgins 62 found in 9,277
mature pregnancies, that 1.2% lasted over 44 weeks and that
57.5% delivered in the forty and forty-first weeks. He states:
"Records of grossly prolonged pregnancy with a normal foetus
are exceedingly rare. I have not been able to trace any reports
in British literature." Walker states: 63
It is notoriously difficult to be certain of the gestational
age of any pregnancy when the decision has to be made
after about 24 weeks, in labour, after delivery, or in any
way in retrospect. In any hospital population even with
excellent systems of assessment 18 to 20 per cent of cases
have 'doubtful' dates of delivery. A good menstrual history
along with clinical assessment of uterine size before the 16th
week is the only method of establishing a clinical duration
of a given pregnancy and it is at the first visit that such a
decision should be made.
In any event, utilizing the Naegele rule and subtracting a
reasonable time for the interval before conception, most cases
center around pregnancies of 266-270 days. Other means of esti-
mating length of pregnancy are measuring the size of the ab-
domen or the date of quickening (about 22 weeks in those having
a first child or 24 weeks in those with previous children). These
are very gross yardsticks. Another means of ascertaining preg-
nancy is afforded by the various hormonal tests which may be
positive two to four weeks after onset of pregnancy.
58 Burkons, H. F., Prolonged Pregnancy, 53 Ohio M. J. 1151 (Oct., 1957).
59 Nesbitt, R. E., Jr., Postmature Pregnancy, Clinical Obstetrical Aspects,
165 J. Am. M. Assn. 1656 (Nov. 23, 1957).
60 Nesbitt, R. E., Jr. Postmature Pregnancy, 8 Obst. Gyn. 157 (Aug., 1956).
61 Brown, L. T., Duration of Pregnancy, 53 Rocky Mountain M. J. 541 (May,
1956).
62 Higgins, L. G., Prolonged Pregnancy, 63 J. Obst. Gyn. Brit. Empire 567
(Aug., 1956).
63 Walker, J., Prolonged Pregnancy, 180 Practitioner, Lond. 658 (June, 1958).
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss2/5
CLEVELAND-MARSHALL LAW REVIEW
Various textbooks of obstetrics point out the difficulties of
measurement.
6 4
It is important to exclude variations due to obstetrical mon-
strosities. For instance, anencephalic monsters (lack of develop-
ment of brain and head) may be quite delayed in time of de-
livery. Higgins 5 reports a case of 389 days duration, but such
cases are noted by the physical abnormality which must be taken
into account. Unable to find English cases of prolonged duration,
he reports on several German cases in the literature.6 6
Another factor to be considered is the syndrome of pro-
longed pregnancy or postmaturity which is arbitrarily measured
by including all cases more than two weeks or three weeks
beyond the expected date (depending on the author). There are
numerous anatomic and physiologic features which are part of
this syndrome which are not relevant to the purpose of this
article, which is concerned only with the factor of duration-
information of which has been extracted where possible from
discussions of postmaturity. Those interested are referred to the
articles by Strand6 7 and Lindell.6s For those who can afford a
prolonged vacation, the reader is referred to an article by Nes-
bitt 69 which lists no less than 416 articles on the subject.
The dearth of cases of prolonged pregnancy (beyond 300
64 (a) Wilson, J. R., Beecham, C. T., Forman, I., and Carrington, E. R., Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology, C. V. Mosby Co., St. Louis, 1958.
(b) Titus, P., The Management of Obstetrical Difficulties, C. V. Mosby
Co., St. Louis, 1945 (3rd. Ed.). Instances of pregnancy lasting 11
lunar months usually are merely an error in the patient's calcula-
tion.
(c) Kerr, J. M. M., Obstetrics and Gynecology, The Williams and Wil-
kins Co., Baltimore, 1946 (4th Ed.). He quotes cases of 313, 320, 331
days from the commencement of the last period.
(d) DeLee, J. B. and Greenhill, J. P., Principles and Practice of Ob-
stetrics, W. B. Saunders Co., Philadelphia, 1951 (10th Ed.)
65 Higgins, L. G., Prolonged Pregnancy, 2 Lancet 1154 (Dec., 1954).
66 (a) Von Schubert, E., 11 Geburtsh. U. Frauenheilk 334 (1951) - 337 days.
(b) Kirchoff, H., 1 Geburtsh. u. Frauenheilk 187 (1939) - 3 cases of 321
to 338 days.
(c) Tausch, M., 93 Mschr. Geburtsh. Gynak. 137 (1933) - 343 days with a
minimum of 315 days since conception.
(d) Wittenbeck, F., 51 Zbl. Gynak. 2094 (1927) - 360 days in an anencep-
halic foetus.
67 Strand, A., supra, n. 57.
68 Lindell, A. E., Prolonged Pregnancy, 35 Acta Obst. Gynec. Scand. 136
(1956).
69 Nesbitt, R. E. L., Jr., Prolongation of Pregnancy: A Review, 10 Obst.
Gynec. Survey 311 (1955).
See also Benson, R. C., The Postmaturity Problem, Bull. Vancouver
Med. Ass. (Sept., 1957).
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days after conception) in English and American medical litera-
ture is striking. Inasmuch as pregnancy is easy to diagnose
within the first month, one would expect verified reports of such
cases if they occurred with any frequency.
Most of the dates mentioned were those from the last normal
menstrual period-a very inaccurate gauge of pregnancy.
Women do not become pregnant in relation to the period, but in
relation to ovulation with subsequent fertilization. Thus if ovula-
tion could be measured accurately, a much finer yardstick would
be available inasmuch as fertilization takes place within about
one day of ovulation (a factor which is utilized in the various
rhythm systems of birth control). It is known that at the time of
ovulation, there is an abrupt rise of body temperature. The
importance of this will be explained below.
Medical Opinion As Reflected in a Questionnaire
With the unsatisfactory information available, a question-
naire was designed to ascertain general medical opinion. These
questionnaires were sent to the professors of obstetrics at eighty-
four medical schools in the United States. Replies were received
from thirty-eight professors.70 Unfortunately it was not spe-
cifically asked that responses were to indicate pregnancy from
estimated date of conception rather than the last normal men-
strual period. Therefore, responses are undoubtedly based on
both measurements. As will be seen, this is not too important
as far as this study is concerned.
70 Questionnaires were returned by
following medical schools:
Albany Medical College
Baylor University
Chicago Medical School
College of Medical Evangelists
Cornell University
George Washington University
Jefferson Medical College
Johns Hopkins University
Marquette University
Medical College of Georgia
Medical College of Virginia
New York Medical College
Tufts University
Tulane University
University of Arkansas
University of California (San
Francisco)
University of Chicago
University of Iowa
University of Kansas
the Professors of Obstetrics of the
University of Louisville
University of Maryland
University of Miami
University of Michigan
University of Missouri
University of North Carolina
University of North Dakota
University of Oklahoma
University of Oregon
University of Pittsburgh
University of South Dakota
University of Southern California
University of Vermont
University of Washington
University of Wisconsin
Wake Forest College (Bowman
Gray School of Medicine)
Washington University of St. Louis
Wayne State University
Western Reserve University
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The five basic questions asked were:
(1) In your experience, what is the longest verified pregnancy
that you have encountered?
(2) In your talking with fellow obstetricians, what is the longest
verified pregnancy that you have heard mentioned?
(3) In your reading of the literature, what is the longest verified
pregnancy that you have encountered?
(4) What would be your guess as to the maximum period of
pregnancy possible in the human female?
(5) Where do you think that courts should draw the line?
The results of this questionnaire are tabulated in Table 2.
For purposes of brevity, comments and explanatory notes have
been omitted from the chart.
TABLE 2
Results of Questionnaire on Duration
of Pregnancy-38 received
PREGNANCY TOTAL 280- 290- 300- 310- 320- 330- 340- 350- 360- Over
IN DAYS RESPONSES 289 299 309 319 329 339 349 359 369
Question 1 35 1 4 16 6 3 3 1 1 0 0
Question 2 29 1 2 15 4 3 3 0 1 0 0
Question 3 18 0 0 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 2(389)
Question 4 25 0 3 6 6 4 1 1 3 0 1(455)
Question 5 26 0 5 6 0 4 2 3 4 1 1(455)
Some observations are in order. It must be stressed that
this was not a scientific study, but a collection of opinions. Many
of the letters commented that the word "verified" made dubious
many of the responses, and often the difficulties in measurement
were mentioned. The biggest response was obtained on Ques-
tion 1, which was based on personal experience. The vast bulk
of opinion was in the 300-320 day range. On Question 2, which
was also based on personal experience (by hearsay), the results
were basically the same. On Question 3, there was much greater
variability. The striking element was the sparsity of responses,
less than one-half answering. It was apparent that many isolated
reported cases are simply not believed. Two referred to the case
previously reported by Higgins of an anencephalic monster (an-
other defect of the questionnaire was that it did not stipulate
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that information was desired only about viable non-monsters).
Many questions were raised as to the validity of reported cases,
and some while reporting them indicated disbelief.
The answers to Questions 4 and 5 were most striking-one
being on estimates of the possible duration of human pregnancy
and the other on recommended limitations for the use of courts.
A very wide expression of opinion was obtained, with one pro-
fessor indicating that a pregnancy of 455 days was possible.
Several commented that the legal problem was not to pick a
number, but that each case must be evaluated in accordance
with the medical information available, the types of people and
the problem involved, and the utilization of all pertinent infor-
mation.
To sum up the results from this small sampling:
(1) About two-thirds reported pregnancies in the 300-319
day range (However, how many represented estimates in accord-
ance with the Naegele rule is not known. Many criticized this
system of measurement).
(2) Most do not believe published reports as to unusual
periods of gestation.
(3) There is a very wide range of opinion as to duration of
pregnancy.
This study points up what has already been alluded to-the
failure thus far of accumulation of scientific data, primarily
because of lack of measuring tools.
Use of Basal Temperatures in Studying Length of Pregnancy
Stewart 7' has written an oft-quoted article on the duration of
pregnancy. He discusses the problem of measurement and defines
postmaturity as those pregnancies extending fifteen or more days
beyond the expected date of confinement. In his study, he kept
basal temperature records to indicate ovulation in 135 pregnan-
cies. In this group, all pregnancies terminated in 250 to 285
days from ovulation, with an average of 266 to 270 days. He
presents a case of a woman, age 21, in her first pregnancy who
menstruated on two occasions during the month preceding the
last normal menstruation. A female baby, weighing 3930 gin.,
was delivered 344 days later. Basal temperatures showed ovula-
tion on the 66th day, and the duration of pregnancy from that
71 Stewart, H. L., Jr., Duration of Pregnancy and Postmaturity, 148
J. A. M. A. 1079 (1952).
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date was 278 days. "Life was believed present at the 18th week
from menstruation and, as so often found in many cases of this
study, is an unreliable symptom on which to base any calcula-
tions." Another case, whose pregnancy as measured from the
last menstrual period was 349 days, was only 250 days measured
from ovulation.
Postmaturity among the 135 cases in this study did not
exceed three weeks. There was no evidence to support the
alleged prolongation of human pregnancy to 10, 11, or 12 months
-delay in ovulation accounting for all such instances in this
study. He feels that postmaturity is short and does not extend
beyond three weeks.
He commented on the 300 day limitations in Switzerland,
Scotland, France, and Italy, 307 days in Austria, and 302 days
in Germany, feeling that they are liberal yardsticks. He dis-
cusses several English and American cases,72 where much longer
periods were involved.
Stewart concludes that the maximum duration of pregnancy
as determined by ovulation, which is the closest measurement
of actual pregnancy, is 285 days. He feels that 300 days might
be used as a reasonable limitation. "Longer periods seem most
questionable and are conspicuous by the complete absence of any
supporting data from this study."
Conclusions
The question of paternity and prolonged pregnancy is a
common one in the courts. While many European nations stick
to firm rules, English and American courts have individualized
each case so that there is great variance. In general, our courts
of law favor legitimacy where possible, and so they usually
attempt to favor the woman (e.g., loose standards) where pos-
sible. Thus in all probability, there are many men in England
72 Gaskill v. Gaskill, L. R. (1921) Prob. 425, English Probate Division, 90
L. J. P. 339, 21 A. L. R. 1451 (1921) --- 331 days.
Lockwood v. Lockwood, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (1946) (Where 355 days were
ruled possible).
Wood v. Wood, Divisional Court, Eng. 1947, L. R. (1947) Prob. 103-
Eng. Probate Division, Vol. 117 (1948) Law Journal Reports 784 (346 days).
Preston--Jones v. Preston Jones, House of Lords, Eng. Dec. 49, 65 T. L. R.
620; 47 L. G. R. 696; 93 S. J. 497-CA, 1949 Mews' Annual Digest of Eng.
Case Law 107 (360 days, divorce finally granted). Lord Simonds said, in
this case, "It is repugnant that a court of Justice should be so little in
accord with the common notions of mankind that it should require evidence
to displace fantastic notions."
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and the United States whose only claim to paternity rests on a
court order.
However, while the law has fared poorly with this problem,
medical science has done even more poorly. It is a humorous
and almost fantastic situation that we cannot delimit this prob-
lem more clearly in the face of billions of births and generations
of study. Much medical research remains to be done. One
avenue of approach is the measurement of large numbers of
pregnancies by the time from ovulation as indicated by tempera-
ture studies. If obstetrical staffs at large medical centers could
enlist the support of as many patients as possible, it would seem
simple to accumulate a significant number of pregnancies-for
example, one hundred thousand. Analysis of these figures could
give all concerned a clearer idea of the problem at hand.
Until that time, the present individualized method seemi
the appropriate manner to handle these cases. It might be help-
ful in cases where delivery of a child takes place more than 300
days following an alleged last intercourse to eliminate the pre-
sumption of legitimacy rule, since statistically the odds are so
much greater that there was subsequent copulation. Because
something is theoretically possible does not mean that it is
reasonably possible. There should be supporting data in cases
of indicated prolonged pregnancy-the best help available being
the information obtained by the physician early in the preg-
nancy.
In any event, this is one medicolegal situation where medi-
cine and law are equally matched-and equally confused.
After innumerable millenia of reproduction, we are in much
the same position as a curious Adam might have been, had he
turned to his mate and asked: "Say, Eve, how long does a
pregnancy last?"
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